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  1LOBBYING FOR LEGISLATION: AN EXAMINATION OF WATER RIGHTS TRANSITION IN 
COLONIAL VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA 1840-1886 
 
This paper analyses the transition of water rights institutions in Victoria, Australia, between 1840 
and 1886.  It will focus on the shift from the common law doctrine of riparian rights to government 
control of water supplies via quasi-government organisations known as irrigation trusts examining 
factors leading to this transition and whether it increased institutional efficiency.  Evidence 
suggests transition to government control resulted from two factors.  First, the decreasing costs of 
using government relative to costs of private redefinition because settlement numbers increased 
thereby increasing scarcity while adding to costs of private investment in redefinition due to higher 
negotiation and enforcement costs, legal uncertainty, and the inability for private actors to capture 
the full benefit of a transition.  In this way, transition was efficient as it lowered transaction costs 
associated with creating irrigation schemes to provide water supply security.  Second, crisis of 
drought that increased in magnitude over the period due to changes in dominant farming methods 
from land extensive grazing to land intensive crop farming.  Drought escalated demands, via 
lobbying, for government action.  Combined, these two factors explain why an efficiency enhancing 
transition from riparian rights to government control took place at this juncture in Victoria’s history. 
 
Analysis of the historical evolution of property rights to water in Victoria is decidedly absent from 
both economics and history literature.  While a number of authors have made reference to 
Victoria’s historical water institutions, there has been little investigation into how and why these 
institutions evolved and whether the evolutionary path followed led to the creation of more efficient 
arrangements over time.
1  This paper aims to fill part of this gap via analysis of the evolution of 
water rights in Victoria from 1840 to the passing of the 1886 Irrigation Act employing the theoretical 
framework developed by new institutional economists that provides a basis for examination of 
property rights transition that can promote natural resource use efficiency while adding to long run 
economic growth.
2  In this way, this investigation will not only provide a deeper understanding of 
Victoria’s water rights evolutionary path, but also contribute to the wider institutional literature. 
 
The period examined saw a transition away from the British common law doctrine of riparian rights 
to government control of water supplies via quasi-government organisations referred to as 
irrigation trusts.  Evidence suggests the transition to government control was a result of two 
factors.  First, decreasing costs of using government compared with private definition costs 
resulting in an increased demand for the government alternative.
3  In this way, the transition was 
efficient as it lowered transaction costs associated with creating irrigation schemes intended to 
increase water supply security, maintain a large rural population, and build a viable agricultural 
sector to support economic development while overcoming inefficiencies of the riparian doctrine 
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eroded initial efficiency gains by retaining government ownership when full private ownership 
would have yielded increasing economic benefits these early efforts to create institutions that 
supported economic development were efficient.
4  Second, crisis, in the form of extreme drought, 
reinforced demands for government action. During the period examined here drought occurred in 
1857-1858, 1864-1866, 1877-1878, and 1880-1886.  In turn, changes in land policy over a similar 
period increased the number of small, capital poor farmers in the more arid regions magnifying the 
impacts of drought and the crisis it created. 
 
The data used here are from both primary and secondary sources.  Primary sources include 
government reports such as Royal Commission, legislation, and census data as well as regional 
and colony-wide newspapers.  By the 1880s Victoria had over 200 newspapers and journal in 
circulation providing a rich source of information regarding the issues and challenges of colonial 
life.  In this way, they are an important source of data for understanding factors promoting a water 
rights transition during the period being examined.  Secondary data are from various authors 
investigating aspects of Victoria’s colonial history including, land policy, the political and legal 
system, and predominant water uses and institutions.   
 
This paper is arranged as follows: section two provides a brief literature review.  Section three 
discusses the nature of settlement in Victoria’s from 1840 to approximately 1860 and the 
functioning of the riparian doctrine.  Section four outlines the shift in settlement policy during the 
1860s, prompted by the end of the gold rush, as the precursor to more substantial changes in 
water rights during following decades.  Section five analyses the main factors leading to 
institutional transition in water rights during the late 1870s until the Irrigation Act (1886) and 
examines whether this shift was efficient. Section six gives some concluding remarks. 
 
II   PROPERTY RIGHTS LITERATURE 
The evolution of property rights is the subject of a growing literature aimed at providing a 
theoretical framework to analyse the path of economic growth in different regions within countries 
and countries themselves.
5  Such analysis can provide a deeper understanding of how institutional 
choices made in different historical periods affect an economy’s performance and income 
distribution via impacts on efficiency (Libecap in Anderson and McChesney (eds.), 2003).  Property 
rights are endogenous and dynamic, and evolve in response to changes in technology, relative 
factor scarcity, and state behaviour (Anderson and Hill, 1975: 165; Anderson and Hill in Anderson 
and McChesney (eds.): 119).  In Anderson and Hill’s (1975) framework these factors act to shift the 
marginal benefit and cost curve that determine the amount of investment in the activity of property 
rights definition where the sum of marginal benefits is determine by the ability of actors to capture 
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by the amount of resources and their opportunity cost needing to be invested to affect the change.  
For instance, as population increased in the more arid areas of Victoria due to government land 
policy changes, water became relatively scarce thereby adding to the benefits of replacing the 
riparian doctrine that restricted use rights to a smaller number of land holders.  In turn, this shifted 
the marginal benefit curve to the right, encouraging increased activity in a reorganisation of water 
right.  While cost-benefit analysis provides a method to understand why investment in activities for 
creation or redistribution of rights take place at certain junctures in history, the form this action 
takes will primarily rely on the level of transaction costs.   
 
Transaction costs influence two key factors crucial to institutional change.  First, the likelihood that 
collective action will take place.  Collective action will be more likely if transaction costs are low.  
Lower transaction costs occur when groups are small, geographically proximate, and 
homogenous.
6  Nevertheless, the optimal size of the group is dependent on the size of the 
geographic area requiring exclusion and scale economies in defence.  In this way, a larger area 
will require a larger collective action group to institute effective change.  Second, they determine 
whether collective action efforts remain private, thereby altering institutional frameworks from the 
bottom-up or whether these activities enter the public sphere where groups lobby government to 
effect institutional change for them.  When private costs are high, collective action will be in the 
form of lobbying.  Private costs will increase in line with decision, defence, violence, and racing 
costs.
7  Decision costs are those costs associated with negotiation which will be higher the more 
heterogenous the group involved.  Defence costs include costs of subsequent enforcement of a 
new property regime that increase with the size of the exclusion area.  Violence costs are those 
costs involved in an individual engaging in violent acts to take more rights than available to them 
under the private rights arrangement.  Racing costs occur where people rush to exploit resources 
before others thereby maximising the rents associated with privatisation of rights.  In turn, the 
higher these costs, the higher the costs of private definition creating an incentive for demands for 
government action which minimise any, or all, of these costs.  For instance, private reorganisation 
of water rights in Victoria became more costly as changes in land legislation increased relative 
scarcity while adding to the heterogeneity of bargaining parties thereby leading to demands for 
government action to overcome these costs.  In addition, demand for government action will also 
be influenced by conditions of crisis such as, war when extension of government control may result 
in the outright replacement of the market mechanism.
8  
 
III  SQUATTER SETTLEMENT AND RIPARIAN RIGHTS 
Victorian settlement expansion accelerated after approximately 1830 prompted by an increase in 
the number of free settlers entering the colony.  These settlers quickly moved into the less 
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successful exploration over mountain ranges into Victoria uncovered some of the richest pastoral 
land in the country.  The subsequent population movement was rapid as settlers rushed to claim as 
much of this area as possible in order to graze sheep and capitalise on the increasing value of 
Australian wool on British markets.
9  As a result, most land in Victoria was fully occupied by the 
early 1850s.  
 
Due to extreme climatic variations, characterised by constant, crippling drought, securing blocks 
with water access was a crucial determinant of initial settlement patterns.  While drought increased 
the value of water frontage blocks for squatters, so too did the operation of the common law of 
riparian rights.
10  The riparian doctrine dictated only those owning land that came in contact with 
the water source could acquire riparian rights.  Water use activities under this common law were 
determined by the reasonableness doctrine.  The condition of reasonableness meant that in 
activities deemed ‘ordinary’ under the doctrine, that is domestic and stock use, riparians use was 
unrestricted.  However, in any other activities, such as irrigation, deemed ‘extraordinary’ a riparian 
was required to ensure water flowing to lower riparians was unaffected in both quality and quantity.  
In this way, riparians were equal in both right and obligation and subject to constraints determined 
by their being part of the ‘community of the river.’  While there is little dispute the riparian doctrine 
was an inherently inefficient institutional framework for arid environments having the potential to 
result in resource wasting violence like that which occurred in the Riverina district of New South 
Wales in the 1860s, there is no evidence of water disputes, either violent or non-violent, in Victoria 
during its operation.
11  Nor is there evidence that squatters attempted to replace this doctrine as 
occurred in the more arid regions of the western United States (US) during a similar period.  In 
terms of the efficiency gains that would have been captured with a transition toward private 
property rights; this lack of evolution is surprising.  Nevertheless, this can be explained via 
examination of marginal costs and benefits accruing to investors in allocating resources to 
institutional change.
12  Evidence indicates lack of investment in definition and enforcement activity 
resulted because costs far outweighed benefits that could be captured by this group of settlers.  
Instead, high costs of definition led squatters to invest in three methods to reduce costs of drought 
and inefficiencies of the riparian doctrine.  In turn, the full benefits of these investments were able 
to be internalised. 
 
First, and foremost, squatters’ dominant economic activity, sheep grazing, gave them inherent 
mobility advantages, decreasing costs associated with regional drought and the inefficiencies of 
riparian rights.  While moving their flocks’ large distances during drought was costly, it was less 
costly than attempting to negotiate and enforce contracts to effect a change in water rights over a 
small but dispersed population.  In turn, this implies demand for water was lower than supply 
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Gains from mobility were further enhanced by squatters’ claiming enormous tracts of land coupled 
with scattering of these claims to include geographically disparate areas.
13  In Anderson and Hill’s 
(1975) framework this shifted the marginal benefit curve of property right change to the left 
reducing investment in this activity. 
 
Second, squatters’ invested in construction of rudimentary dams to reduce drought costs.  While 
these were illegal under the riparian doctrine, squatters’ vast land holdings meant many of the 
smaller rivers where construction took place were within the boundaries of their properties, 
minimising the likelihood of legal challenges.  In addition, the threat of legal challenges was limited 
because court action was prohibitively costly and uncertainty surrounding the application of riparian 
rights reduced the probability of winning.
14  Uncertainty regarding riparian rights existed because 
squatters’ did not own the land they occupied.  Given acquisition of riparian rights was subject to 
ownership conditions, squatters’ could not be sure claims under the doctrine would be recognised 
by Victorian courts.  Nevertheless, even if riparian rights were upheld, the colonial government 
could, at any time, remove squatters from land without compensation thereby increasing costs 




Finally, squatters’ invested in sinking wells to tap into artesian water supplies that would be used to 
supplement surface water during times of severe drought while avoiding riparian laws.  During this 
period, artesian water was an open access resource and while the costs of finding potable water 
below the surface were high, once discovered, use was unrestricted.  This made investment in 
accessing artesian supplies lower than costs of altering the riparian doctrine. 
 
While squatter settlement dominated initial population expansion, by the start of the 1850s gold 
discoveries in Victoria (1851) altered the relative institutional equilibrium.  By the time 
technologically available supplies of gold had been exhausted by small, capital poor miners in the 
early 1860s, massive population influx into the colony led to a shift in government land policy which 
attempted to create employment in agriculture for the now unemployed gold miners while removing 
squatters’ land monopoly. 
 
IV   THE SELECTION ERA 
Government attempts to provide employment opportunities for the gold mining population in an 
underdeveloped industrial economy relied primarily on creation of a large-scale agricultural sector.  
In part, this was driven by desires to recreate population density and social structure of the English 
countryside, referred to as the sturdy yeomanry.
16  This period of land reform (1862 to 
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enactments introduced free selection before survey.  Selection permitted smaller settlers to claim 
up to 320 acres of land anywhere in the colony except land owned under freehold.  By definition, 
this included land already occupied by squatters.  Resenting this encroachment squatters wasted 
substantial resources exploiting various loopholes in legislation to maintain their landholdings.  For 
example, squatters employed dummy selectors who would register claims in their own names then 
transfer land to squatters for a fee.  While this was an unproductive activity diverting squatters’ time 
and capital to non-productive evasion efforts, it did allow squatters to stave off large land losses 
during the following decades.  For this reason, on the whole, contemporary analysts argue 
selection failed to attain government aims.
17   However, it did increase the number of settlers in the 
more arid districts and thereby, employment in the agricultural sector (refer to table 1, below).   
 
Table 1: Victorian population by location 1861-1901 
 
   Capital City 
(Melbourne) 
Other urban
a Rural  Employment in Rural 
Industries
b
1861  123,061 112,249  303,357  50,301 
1871  191,449 182,701  357,378  82,327 
1881  262,389 173,054  426,903  119,527 
1891  474,400 140,956  515,067  100,  479 
1901  484,103 163,294  552,207  126,840 
 
a Other urban is representative of rural centres such as Ballarat, Bendigo, and Geelong (Source: Vamplew, 
W., (1987), Australian Historical Statistics, p. 41) 
b Figures include casual and permanent employees (excluding Aboriginals) as well as proprietors and their 
families (Source: Vamplew, W., (1987), Australian Historical Statistics, p. 72) 
 
In turn, selection also altered nature of settlement signalling a shift away from land extensive 
grazing to land intensive crop farming thereby removing the inherent characteristics previously 
allowing relatively efficient efforts by squatters to reduce costs of drought while avoiding high costs 
associated with altering the riparian doctrine.  As a result, high costs of drought now came to be 
borne by a significantly larger number of voters in more arid districts threatening to sway future 
election outcomes for their parliamentary representatives.  Given these effects, it is not surprising 
the issue of water supply provision quickly became politicised during the 1870s. 
 
Demands for government action resulted because costs of using government to effect a transition 
in property rights decreased relative to the cost of private investment in definition and enforcement.  
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investment to provide water supply security. Second, higher population density added to intensity 
of river use thereby increasing relative scarcity.  Third, there was increased potential for legal 
action under the riparian doctrine.  In addition, potential cooperative arrangements for 
infrastructure construction also became more costly because they required negotiation with larger 
numbers of individuals adding to contracting and enforcement costs.  In turn, according to 
Anderson and Hill’s (1975) framework, the marginal cost function shifted left.  And, when the 
drought of 1877-1878 dried up many inland rivers and lakes creating a major crisis for these 
settlers, government could no longer ignore demands for action as “thousands of small farmers 
and their families were in dire distress, with only their votes to lift them out of their misery.”
18
 
While rural parliamentary representatives could not fail to be aware of the potential losses they 
would incur if not re-elected, lack of water supply security had much wider ramifications for 
government economic development plans.
19  Economic development policy was based on 
establishment of a viable agricultural sector to create employment.  This could only be achieved via 
maintenance of high rural population density.  Therefore, if parliament failed to provide domestic 
water supply security, this policy would fail.  As a result, in 1878, the government commissioned an 
investigation into provision of rural domestic water supply by a newly created body, Water 
Conservancy Board (WCB).
20  The WCB’s early investigations focused on planning, finance, and 
administration of domestic supply schemes in rural centres, such as Swan Hill and Kerang.   These 
investigations formed the basis for legislative action in the form of the Water Distribution and 
Conservancy Act (1881) providing treasury finance for domestic schemes to be paid back via 
application of property taxes.  Financial management and administration was vested in newly 
created local bodies, waterworks trusts, organised along similar lines as local councils.  While this 
legislation did not abolish riparian rights, to prevent riparian legal challenges, it gave trusts power 
over surface water supply within their jurisdiction both to divert water itself and grant licenses 
enabling others to divert.
21  Given the high costs of private action, as noted, this new institutional 
arrangement was efficient in that it improved access to water supplies for those without riparian 
rights, limiting economic costs associated with drought.  In addition, it ensured the maintenance of 
relatively high rural population density to support employment and investment in agricultural 
development. 
 
Paralleling state action, a number of settlers attempted to augment water supplies via 
individual and collective experiments in irrigation despite relatively high costs.
22  While 
newspaper evidence notes only four cooperatives during the early to mid-1880s, these 
details indicate potential for institutional evolution in water rights from the bottom-up like 
that which occurred during a similar period in many western states of the US with the 
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23  However, this possibility was quickly eroded as 
successive legislative action attempted to exert further control over water supplies within 
the colony by expanding the trust system thereby slowly eroding, but not entirely removing, 
the application of riparian rights.  Extension of the trust system came in 1883 with 
amendment to the Water Conservation and Distribution Act (1881) allowing irrigation trusts 
to be formed along similar lines to waterworks trusts.  While potential benefits of forming 
irrigation trusts included increased water supply security, improved land values, and 
increases in current and future income due to higher output no trusts were formed under 
this legislation due to the existence of prohibitively high transaction costs. 
 
Transactions costs were prohibitively high for three main reasons: minimum numbers required for 
trust formation; details required in formation petition; and lack of finance.
24  First, this act permitted 
formation of a trust only if three-quarters of the landowners, owning two-thirds of the land in the 
proposed district agreed.  This increased the likelihood of expensive, protracted negotiations with 
large numbers of owners as well as potential for hold-up.  Private cooperative schemes could avoid 
these costly negotiations by restricting scheme size and therefore, the number of landowners 
involved.   
 
Second, petitions to form trusts required immense amounts of information on proposed schemes.  
Information required by parliament included: amount of land irrigable and its estimated value; water 
quantities to be used; value of already constructed water works in the region; engineering plans 
and a description of works to be constructed; and estimated cost.
25  This required substantial 
investment by petitioners prior to parliamentary approval, increasing costs of government 
sanctioned schemes.  Once approved, changes in design, construction, or layout that may be 
needed due to unanticipated variations in local conditions had to be submitted for parliamentary 
consideration removing flexibility inherent in smaller scale local cooperative endeavours.  In 
addition, the lag time between lodging petitions and approval was considerable.  Evidence 
suggests the few groups that applied for formation of irrigation trusts under the 1883 act waited 
anywhere from 12 to 18 months for approval.
26  Finally, transaction costs were high because even 
if approved, financing could only be obtained on the under-developed capital market settlers knew 
little about.  Therefore, it is not surprising to find private cooperation was preferred.  High costs 
meant efficiency gains created by removing potential for riparian challenges and associated hold-
up under this legislation were eroded.  In turn, both individual and collective private efforts 
continued to dominate irrigation in the colony. 
  
While local councils and waterworks trusts provided some support to irrigation cooperatives and 
individuals for instance, infrastructure to prevent their interference with public roads and water 
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experimentation but actively discouraged cooperatives.
27  Discouragement was primarily based on 
assertions that private infrastructure construction and water diversions on unregulated rivers were 
illegal under the riparian doctrine.  Therefore, cooperatives risked losing their investment if private 
citizens either destroyed their works or asserted their riparian rights via legal action.
28  In this way, 
the government acted to destroy private solutions to property rights inefficiencies thereby 
increasing demand for its own services.
29  Government efforts to prevent cooperatives and bring 
irrigation under state control were primarily a response to scarcity of water supply as well as the 
fundamental belief that, as discussed, creation of a viable agricultural sector was the only way to 
ensure successful economic development.  In this way, if government had ceded control of water 
to private interests, development aims would be impossible.  As a result, key parliamentarians’ 
argued control of water should be responsibility of government.  Alfred Deakin, key architect of the 
1886 Irrigation Act, refected this attitude in a parliamentary report investigating irrigation in the 
western US, arguing: 
 
The one lesson to be learned [is]….though water [in Victoria] may not be the vital necessity 
it is in most of the irrigated districts of America, it is at least the means by which land can be 
greatly increased in value, in production, and in its capacity of sustaining population, and is, 
therefore, a treasure which no State can afford to give carelessly away.
30  
 
And, while the 1886 Irrigation Act attempted to lower costs associated with irrigation trust formation 
thereby increasing efficiency gains associated with state sponsored irrigation, it also included a 
section (four) vesting ownership of all surface water resources in Victoria in the Crown.  
 
V   IRRIGATION ACT (1886)  
While during the early 1880s irrigation was driven by private sector initiative, these years were also 
characterised by more overt lobbying for public sector intervention to provide funds for large-scale 
irrigation schemes.  From approximately 1883 onward lobbying efforts aimed at concentrating 
public interest on the need for irrigation resulted in creation of large numbers of farmers clubs and 
irrigation leagues organised both within and across electoral boundaries.   These bodies held 
numerous meetings with local parliamentary members and continuously petitioned parliament for 
creation of a ‘national’ scheme.  Increased investment in lobbying rather than private irrigation 
schemes resulted from three factors.   
 
First, provision of treasury funds for domestic schemes signalled willingness on the part of 
government to support extensive rural investment typically beyond the capital means of the 
average settler.  Second, costs of private irrigation far outweighed costs of lobbying.  While there 
  10were numerous reports of successful irrigation experimentation, information on costs is sketchy.  
Given most irrigation undertaken during this period was experimental, methods used by settlers 
varied and costs fluctuated significantly.  For instance, Mr. Crystal at Torrumbarry was estimated to 
have spent £1,000 to irrigate 1,000 acres while estimates for the Officer Brothers scheme at 
Murray Downs were between £200 and £300, including construction of two small dams and 13 
miles of channel to irrigate 12,000 acres.
31  Additional reports of costs in the Kerang Times and 
Swan Hill Observer are similarly unclear.
32  Reports regarding formation and organisation of the 
small number of cooperatives also provided little information regarding costs or individual 
contribution.  For instance, it was estimated the Leaghur and Meering Irrigation Company spent 
£400 to £500 to construct a five mile channel while the Marquis Hill Irrigation Company spent £200 
on construction of a three mile channel.
33  Nevertheless, these estimates were far above the costs 
associated with Irrigation League or Farmers Club membership at approximately 2 shillings, 6 
pence therefore providing a greater incentive for individuals to become members of leagues rather 
than invest large sums in irrigation experiments the benefits of which were uncertain.
34  Finally, the 
number of irrigation leagues and farmers clubs increased between 1883 and 1886 because both 
were election years.  In this way, to ensure they retained their seats, local parliamentary members 
were likely to be more receptive to lobbyists’ demands. 
 
By the end of 1885 there were approximately 15 leagues and clubs in the colony, with details of 
meetings and resolutions recorded in local newspapers.  A number of these meetings were 
attended by local members of parliament intent on ensuring legislative action to guarantee them of 
retaining their seats at the 1886 general election.  At the state level, lobbyists assured government 
that if it failed to invest in irrigation, settlers would be forced to abandon their holdings and 
squatters would reclaim monopoly ownership.
35  Settlers’ abandonment of their claims would lead 
to significant economic losses for the state because it would have removed the possibility for 
creation of permanent, intensive agriculture and therefore, long-run economic development.   
However, lobbying for irrigation did not lead to capture as the majority of Victoria’s population 
remained concentrated in rural areas during the period (refer to table 1, above).  Therefore, the 
interest-group theory of transition does not apply here.  Instead, as theory suggests, lobbying 
resulted from high transaction costs associated with investment in definition and enforcement of 
private rights.  And, while from 1886 Victoria experienced relatively high rainfalls, threat of future 
droughts created an on-going perception another water shortage crisis was inevitable.  Combined, 
these two factors explain why an institutional transition from riparian rights to government control 
took place at this juncture in Victoria’s history, culminating in the Irrigation Act (1886). 
 
In response to increased lobbying, the government appointed a Royal Commission to investigate 
methods of irrigation organisation and finance within Victoria, chaired by the key parliamentary 
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36   In turn, the issues before this Royal 
Commission were not whether irrigation would be supported by the state, but what type of 
institutional arrangement would be successful in promoting establishment of a viable agricultural 
sector.  Therefore, its main enquiries focused on organisation and finance of irrigation in countries 
with similar climates.  While these investigations included examination of irrigation organisation in 
India and Egypt, it was believed the irrigation experience in California and Colorado, where the 
most appropriate comparisons.
37  To better understand the nature of irrigation undertaken in the 
US Deakin toured the western states in 1884 recording his findings in the First Report of the Royal 
Commission.
38  It was this report that led to two key institutional changes relating to water 
allocation in Victoria encapsulated in the 1886 act. 
 
First, Deakin observed the “injurious results of uncertainty” of the legal rights of riparians and 
irrigators in California resulting in a “web of litigation” that had crippled irrigation and threatened 
£40,000,000 of investment in irrigation lands and works.
39  Given the crucial role large-scale 
irrigation was to play in ensuring economic development in Victoria, Deakin argued high costs of 
legal uncertainty must be avoided via legislative action, noting: 
 
The settlement of this difficulty [between the rights of riparians and the rights of irrigators], 
whatever it may be, must be such as to lead to an extension of irrigation by providing for 
utilization of all the waters of the State under conditions that will protect alike the public 
interest and the private appropriator.  The crippled condition of irrigation enterprise still 
remains an impressive warning in a new State before vested interests become to deeply 
involved.  In every country in which the practice of irrigation is grafted upon agriculture for 
the first time, the same difficulties must be met or avoided…Government [in the western 
United States] has done nothing to secure the appropriator of water the fruit of his labours, 
or enable him to take a position in the Courts.  In fact, legislative interference is only desired 




This recommendation was formalised in section five of the Irrigation Act (1886) which abolished 
further acquisition of riparian rights in Victoria.
41  To ensure effectiveness of this section, and 
based on Colorado law Deakin believed to be “by far the most successful” an additional section 
(four) was inserted into the act claiming ownership rights in all water within the colony for the 
Crown.
42  Together, these sections completed the transition in water property rights started five 
years before from private usufructuary rights to public ownership.  And, as mentioned, this 
transition was efficient because it not only overcame high costs of private action to effect a change 
in water rights but also alleviated the drought crisis. 
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In the years immediately following the Irrigation Act (1886), 25 irrigation trusts were constituted.  
However, growth of the irrigation sector failed to attain the expected outcomes.  Numerous 
problems plagued the trust system including delays in infrastructure construction, low skilled 
farmers, and limited access to markets to sell what little output was produced.   In turn, these 
factors created significant financial problems as farmers refused to pay for water either because 
they did not use it or supply failed.  Given loan repayment calculations were based on all land 
within a trust claimed to be irrigable in formation petitions actually being irrigated, it is no surprise 
that trusts’ failure to irrigate resulted in their inability to pay even the four percent interest levied on 
loans provided.  As a result, by the mid-1890s, in the midst of drought and economic depression, 
total indebtedness of trusts was £1,157,460 with only 120,677 acres out of an aggregate trust area 
of 2,373,180 acres being irrigated and the trust system was declared a failure.
43  In response to 
this, yet another institutional transition took place away from decentralisation to centralised, 
government control under a newly created state department, the State Rivers and Water Supply 
Commission that came to dominate water allocation and pricing in Victoria for the next 80 years. 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
This paper used current institutional economics theoretical literature to analyse the factors leading 
to the transition in water rights from common law riparian rights to quasi-government control in 
Victoria, Australia between 1840 and 1886.  It illustrated that initial settlers did not invest resources 
in altering the common law of riparian rights because negotiation and enforcement costs were high 
while precarious land tenure meant benefits of such a shift could not be fully captured by the group 
investing in such a change.  However, variations in land settlement policy after the 1850s 
highlighted inefficiencies of the riparian doctrine as an increase in population and changed farming 
methods added to relative water scarcity and costs of private investment in institutional change.  In 
turn, prohibitively high transaction costs of private action to effect institutional change led to 
increasing demands for less costly government action.  In addition, the alteration in land policy 
magnified the impact of drought leading to significant crises for rural settlers.  This reinforced 
demands for government action provided via legislative action in 1881 (Water Distribution and 
Conservancy Act).  Paralleling this, private collective action in irrigation increased illustrating the 
possibility for institutional change from the bottom-up.  However, this potential evolutionary path 
was prevented by government because its economic development plans relied fundamentally on 
maintenance of public control over water resources.  Therefore, against the backdrop of extensive 
lobbying by rural interests, government encouraged irrigation, but only within an institutional 
framework in which they retained all property to water in the colony.  This was attained via the 
passing of the Irrigation Act (1886) preventing further acquisition of riparian rights in the colony 
while declaring all surface water exclusive property of the Crown.   
  13 
In light of these events it has been argued the institutional transition that took place during this 
period in Victoria’s history was efficient because it overcame transaction costs associated with 
large-scale private irrigation while alleviating the drought crisis.  And while further institutional 
change to at the start of the twentieth century eroded these initial efficiency gains by maintaining 
public ownership when full private ownership would have resulted in increasing economic benefits, 
the factors leading to these inefficiencies will be the subject of further research. 
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